Recently, Kannan et al. [2018] proposed several logit regularization methods to improve the adversarial robustness of classifiers. We show that the computationally fast methods they propose -Clean Logit Pairing (CLP) and Logit Squeezing (LSQ) -just make the gradient-based optimization problem of crafting adversarial examples harder without providing actual robustness. We find that Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) may indeed provide robustness against adversarial examples, especially when combined with adversarial training, and we examine it in a variety of settings. However, the increase in adversarial accuracy is much smaller than previously claimed. Finally, our results suggest that the evaluation against an iterative PGD attack relies heavily on the parameters used and may result in false conclusions regarding robustness of a model. * Both authors contributed equally to this work. . Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013. Jonathan Uesato, Brendan O'Donoghue, Aaron van den Oord, and Pushmeet Kohli. Adversarial risk and the dangers of evaluating against weak attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05666, 2018. Eric Wong and Zico Kolter. Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer adversarial Hessian-based analysis of large batch training and robustness to adversaries. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08241, 2018.
Introduction
Szegedy et al. [2013] showed that state-of-the-art image classifiers are not robust against certain small perturbations of the inputs, known as adversarial examples. Since then, many new attacks have been proposed aiming at better ways of crafting adversarial examples, and also many new defenses to increase the robustness of classifiers. Notably, almost all defenses previously proposed have been broken by applying different attacks [Carlini and Wagner, 2017 , Athalye and Sutskever, 2017 . A prominent defense that could not be broken so far is adversarial training [Goodfellow et al., 2014 , Madry et al., 2017 . There is also a line of work on the provable robustness of classifiers [Hein and Andriushchenko, 2017 , Wong and Kolter, 2018 , Raghunathan et al., 2018 , classifiers which by definition cannot be broken because they derive and report a lower bound on the worst-case adversarial accuracy, i.e. the accuracy of the model on the strongest possible adversarial examples under the given threat model. On the other hand, any attack provides only an upper bound on the worst-case adversarial accuracy, which we will refer to as just adversarial accuracy. The problem with many recently proposed defenses is that they evaluate only upper bounds, which might be arbitrarily loose, i.e. there might exist an attack which is able to reduce the adversarial accuracy significantly compared to some baseline attack. However, one of the main issues with lower bounds is that they are usually too small to be useful, so a special way of maximizing them is applied during training. This may interfere with a proposed defense which one aims to evaluate. Thus, providing non-trivial lower bounds -with or without special training -is an important and active area of research [Wong et al., 2018 , Zhang et al., 2018 , Xiao et al., 2018 , Croce et al., 2018 . Unfortunately, these methods do not yet scale to large-scale datasets like ImageNet, and thus one still has to rely solely on upper bounds on adversarial accuracy to estimate the robustness on these datasets.
Given the recent history of breaking most of the defenses accepted at ICLR 2018 , Uesato et al., 2018 , it is now natural to question any new non-certified defense. Many recent papers [Buckman et al., 2018 , Kannan et al., 2018 , Yao et al., 2018 that claim robustness of their models mainly rely on the PGD attack from Madry et al. [2017] with the default settings. They assume that they evaluate their models against a "strong adversary" and that the adversarial accuracy they obtain is close to the minimal possible. In this paper, we show that it is not the case for CLP, LSQ and some ALP models proposed by Kannan et al. [2018] .
Threat model and attack settings. We consider the classification of images with pixel values in [0, 255] and focus on the white-box threat model, i.e. an attacker has complete knowledge of the model. We consider adversarial perturbations bounded with respect to an L ∞ norm of = 76.5 for MNIST, and = 16 for CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet. We follow the settings of Kannan et al. [2018] and evaluate MNIST and CIFAR-10 models with untargeted attacks. Tiny ImageNet models were evaluated with targeted attacks which is consistent with . For crafting adversarial examples, we used the PGD attack [Madry et al., 2017] with maximum adversarial perturbation and experimented with different number of iterations n, step sizes i , and restarts r. For further comparison we also evaluate all MNIST and CIFAR-10 models against the SPSA attack [Uesato et al., 2018] . When crafting untargeted adversarial examples, we maximize the loss using the true label.
Contribution. First, we give empirical evidence that CLP, LSQ, and some ALP models distort the loss surface in the input space and thus fool gradient-based attacks without providing actual robustness. This can be seen as a particular case of masked or obfuscated gradients [Papernot et al., [Madry et al., 2017] , LSQ, and CLP models trained on MNIST for different settings of step size i and number of iterations n when running the PGD attack with = 76.5. Heatmaps for other models can be found in Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix. For all heatmaps, the adversarial accuracy was evaluated on 1000 points drawn randomly from the test data. 2017, . We illustrate this by analyzing the input space loss surface in two random directions ( Figure 1 ). We provide an extensive experimental evaluation of the robustness of CLP, LSQ, and ALP models on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny ImageNet datasets against the PGD attack with a large number of iterations and random restarts reducing the adversarial accuracy of e.g. MNIST-LSQ model from 70.6% to 5.0% (Table 1 ). Our results suggest that while CLP and LSQ do not provide actual robustness, ALP may provide additional robustness on top of adversarial training. However, the increase is much smaller than claimed by Kannan et al. [2018] (Table 3) , and it remains unclear whether this is actual robustness or the increase in adversarial accuracy is only due to the distortion of the loss surface in the input space. Finally, we highlight the importance of performing many random restarts and an exhaustive grid search over the attack parameters of PGD, especially when the loss surface is distorted. We illustrate this by plotting the distribution of the loss values over different restarts of PGD ( Figure 3 ) as well as heatmaps of the adversarial accuracy for different PGD attack parameters (Figures 2, 9, 10 
Experiments
Following Kannan et al. [2018] we augment the inputs with Gaussian noise (denoted by N (µ, σ) in all tables) when applying CLP and LSQ. On MNIST we use the same LeNet architecture as Kannan et al. [2018] and train all models for 500 epochs with a batch size of 200. For CIFAR-10, we use the ResNet20-v2 architecture [He et al., 2016] and all models are trained for 100 epochs with a batch size of 128. On Tiny ImageNet we use the same ResNet50-v2 architecture as Kannan et al. [2018] and analyze their pre-trained models as well as our own models that we trained from scratch with data augmentation and weight decay for 100 epochs using a batch size of 256. Note that we do not perform any fine-tuning from pre-trained ImageNet models to better understand the contribution of the logit pairing methods. For all models, we use the Adam optimizer [Kingma and Adam, Table 1 : Clean and adversarial accuracy against different attacks on MNIST. Adversarial accuracy is evaluated against the PGD attack using = 76.5 with different number of iterations n, step sizes i , and restarts r. AT denotes adversarial training. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.5 and with N (0, 0.5) noise augmentation. All ALP models were trained with λ = 1.0.
2015], and evaluate on 1000 images drawn randomly from the test data. For crafting adversarial examples, we use the PGD and SPSA attacks implemented in the Cleverhans library [Papernot et al., 2018] . The code and trained models can be found at https://github.com/uds-lsv/ evaluating-logit-pairing-methods.
We visualize the cross-entropy loss in a two-dimensional subspace of the input space in the vicinity of an input point x, where the subspace is spanned by two random signed vectors scaled by = 38.25 for MNIST and = 16.0 for CIFAR-10. We observe that the loss surfaces of models trained with CLP, LSQ, and ALP can contain many local maxima which makes gradient-based attacks such as PGD and SPSA difficult ( Figure 1 and Figures 4, 5 , 6, 7 in the Appendix). In order to deal with this and in contrast to the results given by Kannan et al. [2018] and Engstrom et al. [2018] , we first perform a grid search over the step size i and the number of iterations n of the PGD attack. We then run our attacks with multiple random restarts r and report the adversarial accuracy over the most harmful restarts. We illustrate the importance of performing a grid search over the PGD attack parameters in Figure 2 . Additionally, we show the importance of having many random restarts by plotting the distribution of the loss of the PGD attack across many restarts in Figure 3 , which highlights that there are cases where many random restarts are needed in order to find an adversarial example.
Results on MNIST
The results of our evaluation on MNIST are given in Table 1 . We find that when performing only a single restart of the PGD attack with the default settings, the model trained with LSQ provides an adversarial accuracy of 70.6%. However, as can be seen in Figure 2 , the default PGD settings on MNIST ( i = 2.55, n = 40) are suboptimal compared to having a larger step size and more iterations. As a result, by increasing the step size as well as the number of iterations and restarts, we can significantly reduce the adversarial accuracy of the LSQ model to 5.0%. Following the same approach, we can reduce the adversarial accuracy for the model trained with CLP from 62.4% to 4.1%. We could not achieve a similar reduction in accuracy by using the SPSA attack with r = 1.
For the adversarially trained models, the situation is different. Even our strongest attack could not reduce the adversarial accuracies of the models combining adversarial training with ALP below 89.9% and 85.7%. Further, the ALP model which was trained on clean samples only, achieves a comparable adversarial accuracy of 88.9% against our strongest attack, giving an improvement of 1.7% over the models trained using adversarial training only. Table 2 : Clean and adversarial accuracy against different attacks on CIFAR-10. Adversarial accuracy is evaluated against the PGD attack using = 16 with different number of iterations n, step sizes i , and restarts r. AT denotes adversarial training. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and with N (0, 0.06) noise augmentation. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5.
Model Accuracy
PGD attack i = 2.0 i = 4.0 i = 4.0 n = 10 n = 400 n = 400 r = 1 r = 1 r = 100 Table 3 : Clean and adversarial top-1 accuracy against different PGD attacks using a random target label on Tiny ImageNet. Adversarial accuracy is evaluated against the PGD attack using = 16 with a different number of iterations n, step sizes i , and restarts r. The suffix LL denotes that adversarial examples used for training were crafted with the least-likely target. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.05 respectively, and augmented by N (0, 0.06) noise. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5.
Results on CIFAR-10
Results on CIFAR-10 can be found in Table 2 . Again, we find that both CLP and LSQ do not give actual robustness as the accuracy of the models trained using either CLP or LSQ can be reduced to 0.0% and 1.7%, respectively. This clearly shows that the robustness of 27.0% of the LSQ model against the baseline PGD attack is misleading. On the other hand, we find that ALP can lead to some robustness even against our strongest PGD attack and outperforms adversarial training by 3.4%, which is in agreement with our findings on MNIST. Note that also for CIFAR-10 we can not achieve a similar drop in accuracy by simply using the SPSA attack.
Results on Tiny ImageNet
The results of our experiments on Tiny ImageNet are given in Table 3 . Note that we use targeted PGD attacks for crafting adversarial examples and report adversarial accuracy instead of success rate in order to be consistent with Kannan et al. [2018] . We again find that both CLP and LSQ models do not provide actual robustness. Next, we analyze the model provided by Kannan et al. [2018] "Fine-tuned Plain + ALP LL (λ = 0.5)", which was fine-tuned from a model trained on full ImageNet. Our results show that we can reduce the adversarial accuracy from 31.8% to 3.6%. This suggests that this model does not provide state-of-the-art robustness against white-box PGD attacks. 
Conclusions
We perform an empirical evaluation investigating the robustness of logit pairing methods introduced by Kannan et al. [2018] . We find that both CLP and LSQ deteriorate the input space loss surface and make crafting adversarial examples with gradient-based attacks difficult, without providing actual Figure 3 : Histograms of the loss values for a single point for 10000 random restarts of the PGD attack for CLP model trained on MNIST. We show 4 typical cases, which illustrate that there exist points for which the loss can be successfully maximized only with a good starting point. The vertical red line denotes the loss value of − ln(0.1), which guarantees that for this and higher values of the loss an adversarial example can be found. More histograms can be found in Figure 8 in the Appendix.
robustness. This suggests that the current practice of evaluating against the PGD attack with default settings can be misleading. Therefore, one should consider performing an exhaustive grid search over the PGD attack parameters in addition to performing many random restarts of PGD, which helps to find adversarial examples in such cases (Figures 2, 3) . Finally, we show that the ALP models of The loss surface contains many local maxima and hence makes gradient-based attacks much more difficult. This is in line with our quantitative results in Table 1 , showing that this model does not provide actual robustness and that the gradient-based PGD attack must use many random restarts to successfully craft adversarial examples. Table 1 show that this model is resistant even to our strongest attack with many random restarts of PGD attack. For some points, the loss surface contains local maxima and thus may pose a problem for gradient-based attacks. This is in line with our quantitative results in Table 2 , showing that this model does not provide actual robustness, and a successful gradient-based attack must use many random restarts of the PGD attack. The loss surface may be suitable for gradient descent. This is in line with our quantitative results in Table 2 , showing that there is only a small benefit in using random restarts of the PGD attack. Table 4 : Clean and adversarial top-1 accuracy against different PGD attacks using a random target label on Tiny ImageNet. The suffix LL denotes that adversarial examples used for training were crafted with the least-likely target. If omitted, adversarial examples were crafted using an untargeted attack. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.05 respectively, and augmented by N (0, 0.06) noise. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5. Table 5 : Clean and adversarial top-1 accuracy against different PGD attacks using the least-likely target label on Tiny ImageNet. The suffix LL denotes that adversarial examples used for training were crafted with the least-likely target. If omitted, adversarial examples were crafted using an untargeted attack. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.05 respectively, and augmented by N (0, 0.06) noise. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5.
